The Sisyphus Comments

U. S. Supreme Court Ruling: Montejo v. Louisiana

I have been remiss in posting this recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling. I think, as mentioned by the Charlottesville, VA Commonwealth Attorney, the operational policies of most jurisdictions will not be impacted by this ruling. However, agencies who do not adhere to a policy of not interviewing defendants once counsel has been assigned, may want to review their operational policies.

Thanks to the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police for providing the following overview of the case and the comments from Charlottesville, VA Commonwealth’s Attorney Dave Chapman.

Montejo v. Louisiana, 07-1529 . By a 5-4 vote, the Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which held that once the right to counsel has attached and been invoked by a defendant, the police may not initiate an interrogation of the defendant. The Court here reasoned that “[w]hen a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary.” The Court found that the prophylactic protections of Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), are sufficient to ensure that police do not compel defendants to speak without counsel or badger defendants into withdrawing their invocations of the right to counsel.

The comments below are from Charlottesville Commonwealth’s Attorney Dave Chapman:

I received the note appearing below regarding a decision announced today by the Supreme Court. Overruling Michigan v. Jackson, the Court found that consent of counsel is not required prior to questioning an incarcerated defendant for whom counsel is appointed by the Court without his express request. Miranda warnings and a waiver thereof are sufficient protection against a 6th Amendment violation. The case is highly fact-specific. The defendant stood silently by during an initial appearance at which the court appointed counsel to represent him. He was later questioned by police – after receiving and waiving his Miranda rights – and made an inculpatory admission before he was able to speak with his attorney.

This case does not provide a reason to depart from our longstanding practice of considering an incarcerated defendant to be off limits for questioning purposes after counsel has been appointed at an initial appearance in court (unless counsel’s permission is also obtained). In our local courts’ the defendant is always asked by the judge if he or she would like to court to appoint an attorney in the event retained counsel is unaffordable. In our local system the request for counsel emanates from the defendant himself or herself and is a sufficient indication of a desire on the defendant’s part to interact with police through counsel that Miranda warnings and a waiver thereof are insufficient to establish a presumption that the waiver of counsel is voluntary.